
**European
Union
Terrorism
Situation and
Trend Report
2026**

**EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2026**

PDF Web | ISBN 978-92-9414-099-9 | ISSN 2363-0876 | DOI: 10.2813/5264545 | QL-01-26-007-EN-N

Neither the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) nor any person acting on behalf of the agency is responsible for the use that might be made of the following information.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2026

© European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2026

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the copyright of Europol, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.

While best efforts have been made to trace and acknowledge all copyright holders, Europol would like to apologise should there have been any errors or omissions. Please do contact us if you possess any further information relating to the images published or their rights holder.

Cite this publication: Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2026.

This publication and more information on Europol are available on the Internet.

www.europol.europa.eu

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
KEY FINDINGS	6
DEVELOPMENTS	7
Ideological diversity driving terrorism and violent extremism	8
An instrumental online environment	10
Achieving impact through versatile modi operandi	12
Ongoing geopolitical dynamics affecting EU internal security	14
TERRORISM IN EUROPE IN 2025: OVERVIEW	17
JIHADIST TERRORISM	26
RIGHT-WING TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM	31
LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM	35
ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM	40
OUTLOOK	44
ANNEXES	47
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	57



Terrorism and violent extremism in the EU continue to evolve in scale and complexity, driven by ideological diversity, technological developments and geopolitical instability. In this increasingly dynamic threat environment, the EU must continue to adapt and strengthen its collective response. As it marks its tenth anniversary, the European Counter Terrorism Centre remains firmly committed to serve as a cornerstone of EU counter-terrorism cooperation, innovation and operational support to Member States.

Jürgen Ebner

Acting Executive Director of Europol

INTRODUCTION

The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) 2026 is a situational overview that describes major developments, presents consolidated figures on the terrorism landscape in the EU in 2025, and elaborates on various forms of terrorism motivated by different ideologies¹.

This annual flagship report is based on both qualitative and quantitative information provided by Member States on terrorist attacks and on arrests, convictions and penalties for terrorist offences. Furthermore, Europol's cooperation partners provided valuable qualitative information that helped contextualise developments outside the EU that may influence the security of the EU and its citizens. Information on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences, as well as on amendments to national counter-terrorism legislation, was provided by Eurojust, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation.

According to Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism², which Member States had an obligation to transpose into their national legislation by 8 September 2018³, terrorist offences are "intentional criminal acts" that are listed in the Directive "which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation" and are carried out with the aim of "seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act," or "seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation".

By providing a harmonised definition of terrorist offences, the Directive establishes an EU-wide benchmark concerning the definitions of offences and related sanctions in the area of counter terrorism. National legislation relating to terrorism may differ among Member States, as the framework established by the Directive sets out minimum rules on the definitions of terrorist offences, offences relating to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities, and sanctions. Consequently, the statistical data and analyses presented in the EU TE-SAT reflect the classification of cases as terrorist offences by Member States under their national legislation.

While the primary scope of the EU TE-SAT is to present the situational picture on terrorism, the report also includes descriptions of violent extremist incidents⁴, acts, activities and developments reported by the Member States⁵. While the quantitative overview of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and penalties does not include instances of violent extremism, the latter are included for contextualisation purposes and to provide a more comprehensive picture of the security threats to the EU.

¹ The EU TE-SAT identifies and elaborates on jihadist, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, and ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism. While the categorisation of different types of terrorism based on ideology becomes increasingly complex, it serves the report's needs to systematically structure and analyse information from Member States. This categorisation does not hold any legal or formal value.

² Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj/eng>.

³ Not all Member States were obliged to transpose the Directive into their national legislation. Ireland and Denmark did not, due to respective protocols (Protocols 21 and 22 to the TEU and TFEU).

⁴ When the report refers to "extremist," it specifically means "violent extremist." The shortened wording is used to improve readability.

⁵ There is no legal definition of violent extremism at EU level.

KEY FINDINGS



In 2025, 45 terrorist attacks were reported by 10 Member States, while 486 suspects were arrested for terrorism-related offences across 21 Member States. Jihadism accounted for 24 of the reported attacks and 347 of the reported arrests.



The terrorism threat remains high. Established terrorist and violent extremist ideologies (Jihadist, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, and ethno-nationalist terrorism) persisted, while the threat landscape was further complicated by destabilising ideological currents, blurred ideological boundaries, and other forms of violence.



Most terrorist attacks and plots involved lone actors or small, self-initiated cells, using relatively simple attack methods. However, terrorist and violent extremist actors could exploit a range of operational opportunities. This further complicated the nature and possible manifestation of the threat.



A complex and shifting geopolitical context continued to fuel violent extremist narratives, thereby acting as drivers of radicalisation and recruitment across ideologies. This contributed to threats directed at specific communities (e.g. Jewish or Muslim) within the EU, while ongoing conflicts also increased uncertainty regarding the movements and intentions of radicalised individuals.



The online environment enabled rapid, widespread, and often secure access to a wide range of terrorist and extremist beliefs and actors. This accelerated exposure to terrorist and violent extremist content and facilitated radicalisation processes, but also allowed for enhanced operational coordination.



Developments

01

Ideological diversity driving terrorism and violent extremism

A significant proportion of terrorist attacks and arrests were either claimed by or readily attributed to perpetrators adhering to jihadism. These were followed by other established terrorist ideologies, including right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, and ethno-nationalist terrorism. While individual motivations varied, terrorist offences were generally shaped by coherent and long-standing ideological frameworks.

However, alongside these established ideologies, other belief systems that explicitly seek to cause destabilisation also contributed to terrorism-related incidents within the EU, while the boundaries between previously distinct terrorist ideologies and other forms of violence became more difficult to discern.

Destabilising ideologies

Anti-institutional groups contested democratic bodies and the rule of law in several Member States. Often drawing on conspiracy narratives and disinformation, they were driven by a distrust of political and societal elites and influenced by various extremist beliefs, including elements associated with right-wing terrorism and violent extremism. While not all actors in this milieu had terrorist intent, the narratives and echo chambers in which they operated led to further radicalisation and lowered the threshold for violence.

Hybrid threat actors also continued efforts to instrumentalise proxies to commit terrorist offences. These offences are part of a larger strategic objective of destabilisation that involves persistent, targeted and cumulative disruptions rather than a single, overwhelming attack⁶. Not all criminal acts committed within this context are necessarily categorised as terrorism. Additionally, proxies may be unaware of these strategic objectives and can be treated as expendable.

Nihilistic violent extremism was another increasingly visible development⁷. Perpetrators often emerged from decentralised digital communities that glorify online and offline violent activities, but lack clear and coherent ideological objectives. Embedded within a broader criminal ecosystem, some individuals were driven by violence for its own sake or by other criminal goals. Others, however, deliberately sought to promote chaos and accelerate what they viewed as the collapse of the existing social order. Individuals or subgroups in this ecosystem could be vulnerable to exploitation by malicious actors seeking to advance their strategic goals.

⁶ Europol 2025, EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU-SOCTA 2025): <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf>.

⁷ There is no agreed definition of nihilistic violent extremism at EU level.

The Com network

The Com network is a decentralised online ecosystem, formed by overlapping digital spaces and groups that promote or engage in deviant or extremely violent behaviour⁸. While its configuration is fluid and continuously reshaped through fragmentation and reconfiguration, three principal branches can generally be distinguished: Cyber Com, (S)extortion Com, and Offline Com.

Cyber Com is focused on activities such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, doxing, swatting and ransomware attacks. (S)extortion Com groups groom and extort mostly underage female victims for so-called “bloodsigns”, “cutsigns” and sexual acts. These acts are recorded and used to further extort the victims to commit increasingly violent or humiliating acts. Offline Com groups are mostly focused on committing attacks in real life, such as arson, stabbings or murders.

No single ideology dominates this space and members often lack a coherent or clear goal. The pursuit of status and recognition is often a key driver, but a mix of other motivations also shape these actors’ actions, including an attraction to sexual or other forms of violence, nihilism, misanthropy, satanism, misogyny, or elements of jihadist or right-wing terrorism and violent extremism. While the purpose and modi operandi vary, some subgroups and individuals within this ecosystem specifically seek to destabilise societal structures.

Outside the EU, some subgroups linked to The Com network were designated as terrorist organisations in 2025⁹. Within the EU, several Member States were closely monitoring the phenomenon and have classified some incidents, such as incitement of violent behaviour, as terrorist offences. However, other violent acts linked to this ecosystem may not have been recognised as terrorist offences or did not meet the relevant national legal thresholds, and were instead considered another form of criminality or addressed as public order offences¹⁰.

Blurring boundaries of ideologies

Rather than strict adherence to a single ideological doctrine, numerous acts of violence were driven by a heterogeneous set of beliefs and influences. The boundaries between different terrorist ideologies and other forms of violence were increasingly blurred. This was particularly visible in the context of jihadist and right-wing terrorism and violent extremism.

In the area of right-wing terrorism and violent extremism, long-standing narratives such as neo-Nazism, neo-fascism, white supremacism, anti-Semitism and anti-migrant sentiment remained present. However, these narratives were increasingly influenced by accelerationist concepts, nihilistic justifications for violence, and other violent subcultures or tactics (e.g. hooligan and skinhead subcultures, the manosphere or involuntary celibacy, as well as paedophile hunting). Within jihadist spheres, perpetrators also occasionally displayed less ideological depth. They did not

⁸ Europol 2025, ‘The rise of online cult communities dedicated to extremely violent child abuse’. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/rise-of-online-cult-communities-dedicated-to-extremely-violent-child-abuse>

⁹ The Maniacs Murder Cult and 764 were listed as terrorist organisations by Canada in December 2025. The Maniacs Murder Cult was listed as terrorist organisation by the UK in June 2025.

¹⁰ Coordinated by Europol, Project Compass brings together law enforcement authorities from 28 Member States and partner countries to combat activities linked to The Com network. More information available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/how-we-work/operations/project-compass>

necessarily commit themselves to one organisation or ideology, instead sometimes developing a fixation with violence per se.

Shared visual iconography, narratives or targets could bridge the gap between these otherwise distinct milieus. Concepts such as “white jihad” exemplified the exchange of ideas between right-wing terrorism and jihadism.

This coincided with the continued trend of young perpetrators’ involvement in terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the influence of the online domain. Young radicalised individuals often displayed only a superficial understanding of established ideologies, making them susceptible to a fluid mix of unstable, fragmented and ambiguous ideas. Personal grievances or mental health issues could further increase their vulnerability. Additionally, many terrorist incidents had a digital footprint, as the online environment facilitated the rapid and widespread dissemination of terrorist and extremist content, as well as mobilisation among young people and other at-risk individuals.

Case example

On 30 October 2025, in Italy, a 16-year-old was arrested following a prior search that led to the retrieval of knives, axes and drawings of swastikas. Investigators also found evidence identifying him as the administrator of a messaging app channel where he shared anti-Semitic content, among other things, and encouraged violence against Jewish people and foreign nationals. He also expressed support for, and glorified, mass-casualty attacks.

Terrorist and violent extremist actors have frequently exploited and imitated game-design principles and other gaming features, including competition, rankings, challenges and reward mechanisms. This gamification makes it easier to engage with violent content, contributes to its normalisation, and blurs the distinction between online participation and real-world violence¹¹.

Ideological diversity and perpetrators with fluid or incoherent worldviews are not new phenomena, but they featured prominently in the EU terrorism and violent extremism landscape in 2025. This increasingly complicated the use of clear-cut labels and made it more challenging to provide an exact account of what terrorism in the EU looks like today. Such growing ambiguity gives rise to legal, analytical and operational challenges for those tasked with understanding, assessing and responding to the phenomenon.

An instrumental online environment

In our interconnected world, the online domain is an indispensable facet of everyday life¹². Its impact on the terrorism and violent extremism landscape within the EU continued to grow, in close relationship with such activities carried out offline.

The broad reach, rapid connectivity and ease of information exchange provided by the online environment - combined with its operational security features - were instrumental to terrorist and violent extremist actors across ideological spectrums. They leveraged the digital domain to reach wide audiences, recruit and mobilise individuals, and facilitate the coordination of both online and offline activities.

¹¹ Europol 2025, ‘Europol and partner countries combat online radicalisation on gaming platforms’, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-and-partner-countries-combat-online-radicalisation-gaming-platforms>.

¹² Europol 2025, EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU-SOCTA 2025), <https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf>

Social media and online services

Terrorist and violent extremist content appeared across social media and online platforms of all sizes, from small forums to very large online platforms¹³. Algorithm-driven content amplifies the reach and visibility of such content, enhancing the ability of terrorist and violent extremist actors to engage with a broad population. Young people and vulnerable individuals are particularly susceptible to such exposure and influence.

Content varied widely in tone and severity and often included disinformation and hate speech. Borderline content typically served as an easy entry point. Users who demonstrated initial interest could be drawn in and, in some cases, would progress to networks that shared explicit terrorist and violent extremist material. This escalation in tone usually coincided with a move from mainstream platforms to more secure and private ones.

The style of online propaganda was tailored to specific social media platforms and target audiences, such as young users¹⁴. For example, users shared mash-ups on vlogging platforms and memes and GIFs on image-sharing services. In some instances, user-generated content was preferred over official propaganda, as it is harder to detect and remove. Users regularly edited and modified branded propaganda to spread it more widely.

Case example

On 16 November 2025, in Spain, a 31-year-old woman was arrested on suspicion of consuming, editing and disseminating radical and violent material from official jihadist propaganda, incorporating it into her own productions for distribution. She maintained ties with several convicted jihadists and engaged in significant activity on social media aimed at recruiting and indoctrinating individuals for terrorist purposes.

Audio-based propaganda acted as an additional driver of radicalisation. Compared with videos and images, terrorist and violent extremist content on audio-sharing platforms can be particularly challenging to detect and moderate. Therefore, audio content played a significant role in attracting individuals to terrorist and extremist milieus, shaping perceptions and reinforcing narratives and ideologies¹⁵.

Terrorist and violent extremist actors also continued to exploit gaming and gaming-related platforms, as well as a range of websites, to disseminate terrorist content, cultivate support networks and advance their objectives.

Beyond propaganda and recruitment purposes, social media and online communication channels were also used across ideologies to encourage, facilitate and prepare terrorist offences, for example through operational coordination or the sharing of tactics and instructional materials.

¹³ In 2025, EU Member States competent authorities and Europol assessed 81.862 pieces of online content, regarding 'terrorism', that led to the transmission of 61.412 Referrals to a total of 99 Hosting Service Providers (HSP). Respectively, regarding 'racism and xenophobia', Member States and Europol assessed 7.219 pieces of online content that led to the transmission of 7.093 Referrals to a total of 22 HSPs.

¹⁴ Europol 2025, 'Europol coordinates operation against terrorist content online targeting minors', <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-coordinates-operation-against-terrorist-content-online-targeting-minors>.

¹⁵ Europol 2026, 'Europol coordinates largest referral action targeting terrorist audio propaganda', <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-coordinates-largest-referral-action-targeting-terrorist-audio-propaganda>.

Existing and emerging technologies

Artificial intelligence (AI) was abused by terrorists and violent extremists in several ways. Online users exploited image, audio and video generators to create and edit propaganda, including deepfakes, memes and GIFs. Much of the AI-generated material consisted of hate speech and ‘awful but lawful’ content rather than explicit terrorist content, as most AI tools are trained not to create illegal content. To bypass these safeguards, some users relied on jailbreaking or prompt engineering techniques. Efforts to circumvent these limitations have been shared and documented among users.

AI-powered bots and chatbots were also abused. Bots have a limited set of pre-recorded answers to react to users’ prompts, while chatbots, thanks to large language models (LLMs), process prompts to provide better contextual answers. They were used to boost recruitment, generate and share propaganda and, overall, optimise online engagement and promote violent extremist and terrorist ideologies. Additionally, AI-driven applications were used to conduct preliminary research to prepare attacks.

Terrorists and violent extremist actors also utilised existing and emerging technologies to varying degrees to maintain anonymity, avoid being de-platformed or banned, and secure their communications from law enforcement detection. Users themselves shared instruction materials on operational and online security.

Specific measures included end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging applications and secure email services, virtual private networks (VPN), dark web and related browsers, portable operating systems and anonymity-enhancing platforms. Blockchain-based and decentralised online services have increasingly been used in recent years. Online users have started favouring social media and online services based on these technologies because they allow them to ensure continuity in maintaining a stable network and sharing content. Decentralisation makes it impossible to remove content as a whole. Thus, users have created backup and dummy channels and aliases that automatically respawn if any other instance is deleted.

Achieving impact through versatile modi operandi

Terrorism is not always intended to cause large numbers of casualties, but is designed to generate fear and produce a wider psychological impact.

In 2025, terrorist and violent extremist actors could choose from a range of operational opportunities, driven by their resources and capacity, organisational constellation and the objectives they sought to achieve, to act and generate psychological impact. Different operational possibilities not only diversify the ways in which threats can manifest, but also lead to strategic threats, including the gradual erosion of social cohesion and trust within society.

Attack modes

The terrorist and violent extremist landscape in the EU consisted of a mix of isolated individuals, online communities and physical groups and networks. However, most terrorist attacks and plots involved lone actors or small, self-initiated cells. They often used simple attack methods, such as bladed weapons, firearms, vehicle ramming, or arson, directed against soft targets.

Low-complexity attacks may reflect perpetrators’ limited operational experience or the absence of a network that provides resources or ideological and operational guidance. However, the risk

of sophisticated attacks persists. The growing availability of modern technology continued to lower the barriers to carrying out sophisticated attacks, even by lone actors or small cells. Additionally, some actors may be well-prepared and guided by a clear and coherent ideology, as long-standing hierarchical organisations remained active.

Case example

On 15 April 2025, in Germany, a 29-year-old man was arrested on suspicion of preparing a serious act of violence. Following the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, he allegedly travelled to Lebanon to undergo training in firearms and combat weapons provided by the local Hezbollah group. This training took place in the first half of 2024.

The misuse of explosive materials, especially regulated heavy pyrotechnics, as well as the acquisition of military ordnance such as hand grenades, remained a security threat. Attack preparations also continued to rely on accessible resources and materials, including online manuals and publicly available precursors for homemade explosives.

Case example

On 12 September 2025, in Belgium, two young men linked to the so-called Islamic State's (IS) ideology attempted to manufacture explosives in order to attack a prominent public figure. Their internet searches to learn how to make these explosives led to their detection.

At the same time, terrorist and violent extremist actors continued to show an interest in innovative attack methods. These included 3D-printed weapons, bladed weapons designed to evade metal detection and drones. Wider access to the required materials and technical guidance is deemed to have lowered the threshold for would-be perpetrators to explore these options¹⁶, especially when reinforced by propaganda promoting their use. In 2025, terrorist and violent extremist actors regularly featured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) systems in their propaganda.

Other terrorist offences

Beyond enabling the execution of terrorist attacks, existing and emerging techniques also influenced other terrorism-related offences. This was particularly visible in the context of terrorist financing, propaganda and recruitment.

In the area of terrorist financing, both traditional and newer methods were adopted to collect money, including salaries, donations, crowdfunding campaigns, the sale of propaganda material, entry fees to events, theft, the sale of illicit goods and the creation of fraudulent NGOs. Funds came from both legal and illegal sources. Similarly, a wide range of techniques were used to move and store money. Traditional methods included hawala systems and cash couriers, while more recent technologies included cryptocurrencies and value transfers via games. Hawala service providers are known to have added various online services to their offerings.

Propaganda and recruitment activities also continued to rely on a mix of traditional and newer methods. In-person engagement and the physical dissemination of propaganda remained relevant, including through private prayer spaces, music concerts and training clubs and camps. At the same time, newer technologies, particularly digital tools, accelerated opportunities to produce and distribute content quickly, securely and at a large scale. This sped up short-term

¹⁶ See also: Europol, 2025, 'The Unmanned Future(s): The impact of robotics and unmanned systems on law enforcement', <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/unmanned-futures>.

recruitment and radicalisation, as was illustrated by the growing shift from online activity to real-world violence.

Structural relationships between criminal networks and terrorist actors did not appear widespread, but there is a notable overlap in *modi operandi*, and occasional interactions did occur¹⁷. Both actors can draw on similar recruitment pools and operational tradecraft, infrastructures and tools. This results in a risk of mutual facilitation, service provision, or the use of crime-as-a-service for terrorism-related offences. At the same time, in 2025, some terrorist actors did at times engage in organised crime activities or cooperate with criminal networks to pursue financial or operational objectives, for example through money laundering, weapons trafficking or drug trafficking.

Ongoing geopolitical dynamics affecting EU internal security

Developments outside the EU continued to shape the internal terrorism and violent extremism landscape. Ongoing international conflicts and geopolitical developments, notably in the Middle East, contributed to radicalisation processes, often by fuelling extremist narratives. They also generated threats against specific communities (e.g. Jewish or Muslim) or other targets within the EU, while in some cases also raising concerns about potential travel movements and the long-term security threat associated with detained or displaced individuals.

The Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent developments in the region continued to impact EU internal security in 2025. The conflict was exploited by terrorists and violent extremists across the ideological spectrum, including jihadist, right-wing and left-wing groups. It was leveraged to mobilise support and reinforce respective narratives, often containing anti-Israel, anti-Semitic or anti-Western elements. In some cases, this contributed to terrorist or other violent activities in the EU, including attacks against Jewish targets.

The ‘axis of resistance’

Iran has over time developed a network of proxy groups. Key actors include Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansar Allah, and multiple militias operating in Iraq and other countries. While tensions and confrontation between Israel and Iran-aligned actors predated the Hamas’ terrorist attacks on southern Israel on 7 October 2023, those attacks significantly exacerbated the conflict and contributed to a sharp escalation in hostilities between Israel, Iran and its proxies in the region.

These developments have generated a steady flow of images and reports of death and destruction. Such content has driven - and continues to drive - polarisation in the EU, with anti-Semitism being a unifying narrative among diverse terrorist and violent extremist actors. In 2025, this resulted in cases of radicalised individuals targeting Jewish interests, and the arrests of individuals based in the EU intending to join one of Iran’s proxy groups.

In parallel, growing pressure on Iran and its proxy network may lead to increased direct threats in the

¹⁷ See also: Europol 2026, ‘Decoding the EU’s most threatening criminal networks: Issue 2 – The blueprint of criminal opportunism’, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/blueprint-of-criminal-opportunism>.

EU. Whereas in the past, including in 2025, these groups mainly used the EU for fundraising and logistical support, some may increasingly consider attacks on Jewish, Israeli or other targets in the EU¹⁸.

Case example

In September 2025 in Austria, a weapons cache was discovered that contained five counterfeit pistols and 10 magazines. A 39-year-old with close ties to the Hamas leadership was linked to the cache and presumably planned to carry out attacks. On 1 October 2025 in Germany, three suspected Hamas members were arrested on suspicion of procuring firearms and ammunition in Germany, allegedly intended for attacks on Israeli or Jewish institutions, though no specific targets were identified¹⁹.

Direct security risks in the EU linked to developments in the region persisted in 2026, with indications that Iranian actors and its proxies, including through criminal networks, were involved in a series of incidents across several Member States²⁰.

Jihadist terrorist organisations retained their intent to increase their presence and capabilities in Syria, seeking to exploit the economic, political, and security challenges faced in the region. The persistence of radical narratives; some travel movements by individuals with jihadist motivations from the EU to Syria; the situation of jihadists who had previously travelled to the region; and the presence of incarcerated foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), women and children, all remained significant concerns for multiple Member States in 2025. Additionally, there were ongoing fears regarding the potential infiltration of individuals to the EU intent on carrying out violent acts.

In Africa in 2025, affiliates of IS and Al-Qaeda (AQ) expanded their geographical reach and operational capabilities. For example, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al Muslimin (JNIM) remained significant in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, but also expanded southwards. In the Sahel, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) grew considerably, expanding territorial control and increasing its headcount. At the same time, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) remained highly active in the Lake Chad Basin. As parts of the region remained a hotspot for terrorist and violent extremist groups, there remained key concerns about its attraction for FTFs and the possibility of external operations against the EU.

Multiple Member States also assessed that jihadist groups in central and eastern Asia, particularly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), remained resilient and continued to pose potential security threats, both in the region and externally.

¹⁸ See also, e.g.: Swedish Security Service, 'Situation assessment 2025-2026', https://sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.6d8b207419df2497fd955/1778075300407/SP_La%CC%88gesbild%20ENG_Anpassad.pdf; Dutch General Intelligence and Security service, 'Threat Assessment of State Actors 2025', <https://english.aivd.nl/documents/2025/09/26/threat-assessment-of-state-actors-2025>;

¹⁹ On 25 March 2026, the First Criminal Division of the Berlin Higher Regional Court sentenced four men to prison sentences for membership in a terrorist organisation, Hamas. Although no concrete plans for attacks on European soil were established during trial, the court found that Hamas carries out operational activities in Europe to prepare for possible future attacks on Israeli or Jewish institutions. See: <https://www.berlin.de/gerichte/presse/pressemitteilungen-der-ordentlichen-gerichtsbarkeit/2026/pressemitteilung.1656226.php>.


²⁰ Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formally designated a terrorist organisation by the EU on 19 February 2026, under Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/421. Between 13 February 2026 and 28 April 2026, Europol coordinated an action against terrorist content online linked to the IRGC. See: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/eu-targets-iran-revolutionary-guard-propaganda-ecosystem-in-online-crackdown>

Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine continued to feature in terrorist and violent extremist narratives, particularly within right-wing circles, though it was assessed as being less prominent than in previous years. The conflict remained a point of ideological divergence, with some actors portraying Russia positively as an anti-Western power, while others adopted pro-Ukraine positions. In 2025, concerns persisted that the war could facilitate extremist skill acquisition, illicit weapons trafficking, the exploitation of migratory flows, and further societal divisions within the EU.

Terrorism in Europe in 2025: overview

02

Terrorist attacks and arrests in EU Member States in 2025




In 2025, 45 terrorist attacks (completed, failed and foiled) were reported by 10 Member States, of which 22 were completed, 20 were foiled, and 3 failed. The 22 completed attacks overall resulted in 6 fatalities. This marks a decline from 2024, when 58 attacks were recorded in 14 Member States. These included 34 completed attacks, which resulted in 5 fatalities in 2024.

However, the number of arrests continued to rise, with 486 suspects arrested for terrorism-related offences across 21 Member States in 2025 (compared to 449 in 2024 and 426 in 2023). These figures do not account for the larger number of ongoing investigations.

This may reflect the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts, but simultaneously indicates that the terrorism threat in the EU cannot be assessed solely on the basis of the number of attacks and arrests, casualty figures or geographical breakdown.

Attacks

Terrorist attacks (completed, failed and foiled) per type of terrorism, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2025



Jihadist terrorism accounted for the largest share of attacks in 2025 (24), representing about half of all incidents. The same number was recorded in 2024, but more attacks were completed (nine, compared to six in 2024). The completed attacks occurred in Germany (4), France (2), Austria (1), Ireland (1) and Spain (1), while 15 were foiled in France (8), Austria (6) and Belgium (1). Jihadist attacks were the deadliest form of terrorism in 2025, causing five fatalities and injuring 81 people.

Five attacks were labelled right-wing terrorism. One of these five attacks was completed, in France. Four attacks were foiled, in France (3) and Ireland (1). The one completed attack classified as terrorism resulted in one fatality.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorism accounted for 12 attacks. 11 completed attacks were carried out in Italy (10) and Greece (1). One failed attack occurred in Italy. As in previous years, no victims were reported, as the targets were primarily buildings or vehicles.

No verified terrorist attacks were reported as attributed to ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism within the EU in 2025.

Other and not specified forms of terrorism accounted for four attacks. This included one completed attack in the Netherlands, two failed attacks in Malta (1) and Greece (1), and one foiled attack in Belgium. Six victims sustained injuries due to reported stabbings.

Terrorist attacks per type of terrorism per Member State, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2025

	Jihadist	Right-wing	Left-wing and anarchist	Ethno-nationalist and separatist	Other/not specified	Total
Austria	7	-	-	-	-	7
Belgium	1	-	-	-	1	2
France	10	4	-	-	-	14
Germany	4	-	-	-	-	4
Greece	-	-	1	-	1	2
Ireland	1	1	-	-	-	2
Italy	-	-	11	-	-	11
Malta	-	-	-	-	1	1
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	1	1
Spain	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total	24	5	12	-	4	45

Among the 45 completed, failed and foiled attacks, the most common modus operandi was stabbing (15), followed by bombing (11), arson (7), shooting (5), damage to property (2) and vehicle ramming (1)²¹.

Of the 22 completed attacks, the majority were carried out by lone actors (12), who primarily opted for a simple and accessible weapon of choice, using a bladed weapon (9), a firearm (1), a vehicle (1) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) (1).

Civilians were most frequently targeted, largely among attacks attributed to jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism and other forms of terrorism. Law enforcement headquarters and officers were another common target, among jihadists and left-wing and anarchist terrorists. Private businesses linked to the industrial, financial, tourism and wellness sectors, were exclusively targeted by left-wing and anarchist assailants, who often cited the companies' relations with Israel as the motivating factor for the attack²².

²¹ The modus operandi was not specified for four attacks.

²² Other targets included religious, public administration, education, military, political, critical infrastructure, medi and not specified targets.

Arrests

Arrests for terrorist offences per type of terrorism, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2025



347 individuals were arrested for jihadist terrorism-related offences in 16 Member States, thereby regaining at a similar level to 2023 (334), following a decrease in 2024 (289). The highest number of arrests occurred in Spain (100) and France (64). Most arrests were on suspicion of terrorist propaganda (91), membership (73), and preparation of a terrorist attack (53), followed by participation in the activities of a terrorist organisation (40), incitement and making threats (26), travel (15), financing (12), committing an attack (11), (self) training (7), possession of facilitating items (6), recruitment (5) and other facilitation activities (2)²³.

There were 43 arrests attributed to right-wing terrorism in nine Member States, namely Germany (8), the Netherlands (8), Belgium (5), France (5), Poland (4), Portugal (4), Ireland (3), Italy (3) and Spain (3). The most common offence was incitement and making threats (13), followed by arrests on suspicion of membership (12), planning or preparing an attack (9), participation in the activities of a terrorist organisation (4), committing an attack (1), financing (1), and possession of facilitating items (1)²⁴.

13 individuals were arrested in six Member States on suspicion of left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences. Most of these arrests took place in Italy (6), followed by Spain (2), France (2), Belgium (1), Greece (1) and the Netherlands (1). In five cases, the suspected offence was committing an attack, followed by membership (4), incitement and making threats (2), terrorist propaganda (1), and participation in the activities of a terrorist organisation (1).

There were 34 arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences reported by six Member States: Italy (13), France (7), Germany (5), Ireland (4), Finland (3) and Spain (2). The

²³ Six arrests reported by the Member States did not specify the offence.
²⁴ Two arrests reported by the Member States did not specify the offence.

suspected offences were membership (16), financing (10), committing an attack (7) and terrorist propaganda (1).

49 individuals were arrested for other and not specified forms of terrorism²⁵. Arrests occurred in nine Member States, namely the Netherlands (14), Spain (10), Belgium (8), France (6), Germany (3), Poland (3), Lithuania (3), Luxembourg (1) and Malta (1). Most arrests were on suspicion of participation in the activities of a terrorist organisation (9), incitement and making threats (8) and other facilitation activities (8), followed by committing an attack (6), planning or preparing an attack (4), terrorist propaganda (4), membership (3), possession of facilitating items (3) and self-training (1)²⁶.

Arrests for terrorist offences per type of terrorism per Member State, as reported to Europol by Member States in 2025

	Jihadist	Right-wing	Left-wing and anarchist	Ethno-Nationalist and separatist	Other/not specified	Total
Austria	40	-	-	-	-	40
Belgium	30	5	1	-	8	44
Cyprus	1	-	-	-	-	1
Czechia	6	-	-	-	-	6
Denmark	5	-	-	-	-	5
Estonia	1	-	-	-	-	1
Finland	-	-	-	3	-	3
France	64	5	2	7	6	84
Germany	21	8	-	5	3	37
Greece	-	-	1	-	-	1
Ireland	4	3	-	4	-	11
Italy	26	3	6	13	-	48
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	3	3
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	1	1
Malta	-	-	-	-	1	1
Netherlands	40	8	1	-	14	63
Poland	2	4	-	-	3	9
Portugal	1	4	-	-	-	5
Romania	3	-	-	-	-	3
Spain	100	3	2	2	10	117
Sweden	3	-	-	-	-	3
Total	347	43	13	34	49	486

259 of the 398 individuals arrested for terrorism-related offences whose residence status was known were EU citizens, while 139 were non-EU citizens²⁷. The majority of arrested suspects were male (436)²⁸, with 47 female suspects arrested primarily for jihadist offences²⁹.

²⁵ Other forms of terrorism = 36. Not specified forms of terrorism = 13.

²⁶ Three arrests reported by the Member States did not specify the offence.

²⁷ The residential status of 88 individuals was not specified.

²⁸ The gender of 3 out of the 486 individuals arrested was not reported.

²⁹ 43 of the 47 female suspects were arrested in association with jihadist terrorism.

The average age of the reported individuals arrested in 2025 was 27 years old, with 130 reported individuals being 18 or younger³⁰. The youngest person arrested was 12 years old and linked to right-wing terrorism. The oldest arrestee was 79 years old and linked to left-wing and anarchist terrorism.

Convictions and penalties

21 Member States contributed court proceedings for terrorist offences that were concluded in 2025 to Eurojust³¹. These court proceedings resulted in 406 convictions and 99 acquittals for terrorist offences.

Number of convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences in 2023, 2024 and 2025, as reported to Eurojust

	2023	2024	2025
Convictions	290	426	406
Acquittals	68	59	99
Total	358	485	505

Some convictions and acquittals in 2025 are final, while others are pending, as appeals have been submitted by the prosecution, the defence or both³². In several cases, the persons convicted of terrorism in 2025 had previously been convicted of terrorism or other offences in the same Member State or abroad.

Type of offences in the concluded court proceedings

A large proportion of the concluded court proceedings concerned membership or participation in (the activities of), or collaboration with, a terrorist group, terrorist financing, (attempted) terrorist attacks, or preparation for such attacks. Other offences included murder in a terrorist context, (self)-indoctrination, recruitment, providing or receiving training for terrorist purposes, dissemination of terrorist propaganda, glorification of terrorism, and incitement or threatening to commit terrorist acts. In some of the concluded proceedings, charges for terrorist offences were brought together with charges for weapons- or explosives-related offences, as well as other non-terrorist offences.

Case example

On 27 February 2025, in Germany, an individual was sentenced to a prison term of five years and six months for supporting a terrorist organisation, conspiracy to commit murder, and membership in a terrorist organisation abroad. In August 2023, the defendant and another defendant sent EUR 200 as a donation via an intermediary to an IS member in Iran. He then

³⁰ Member States did not provide information on the age of 23 individuals arrested (15 arrests for jihadism, five arrests for right-wing terrorism, and three arrests for other forms of terrorism have no age recorded).

³¹ Eurojust received contributions containing information on convictions and acquittals from the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. The numbers included in the statistics concern only concluded proceedings for terrorist offences. They do not include proceedings for hate crime, racism or xenophobia.

³² Due to the specifics of reporting, some Member States submit information on final decisions only, while others additionally report on decisions that are not final. If a judgment handed down in 2025 was appealed against and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final judgment.

joined ISKP and was tasked with carrying out an attack in Europe. From then on, he and the other defendant planned to kill police officers and other people with firearms in Stockholm. On 9 September 2023, both travelled to Czechia to purchase firearms and ammunition, but were unsuccessful. The attack was not carried out.

Case example

On 21 March 2025, in France, five individuals were convicted for their involvement in the hostage taking and torture of four French journalists and other Western victims kidnapped in 2013 and 2014 in Syria. The group's leader was sentenced to life imprisonment, with 22 years to be served before he is eligible for parole, for directing a terrorist group and ordering unlawful confinement and torture in a terrorist context. Two other defendants received the same penalty for participation in a criminal enterprise with a view to prepare terrorist acts and unlawful confinement and torture, both in a terrorist context. They were already sentenced to life imprisonment for the 2015 attacks in Paris, the 2016 attacks in Brussels, and for the 2014 attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels, respectively. The fourth defendant was one of the jailers of the hostages and received 22 years' imprisonment. The fifth defendant helped kidnap the victims and was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

Case example

On 6 March 2025, in Germany, a defendant was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for supporting a terrorist organisation abroad and the preparation of a serious act of violence endangering the state. The man supported IS by transferring a total of USD 1 675.59 in cryptocurrency. He decided to join the terrorist organisation as a fighter and received training in the use of firearms. To this end, he planned to travel to Mecca in June 2024 during a pilgrimage with his mother, using IS smugglers to enter IS operational territory and join ISKP. He was arrested at the airport.

Case example

On 12 November 2025, in Malta, an individual was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The man, who travelled frequently to Malta, was arrested in October 2024. He was prosecuted for disseminating a significant volume of extremist propaganda and engaging in the online recruitment of individuals for the purpose of committing terrorist acts across various jurisdictions. Evidence found on his electronic devices included videos promoting acts of terrorism, audio files of jihadist speeches and hymns, and content explicitly supporting IS.

Convictions and acquittals

All the concluded court proceedings reported above, relating to terrorist offences in Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Romania in 2025, resulted in convictions. Some of the defendants acquitted of terrorist offences were found guilty of weapons-related offences, participation in an organised crime group, murder, or other criminal offences³³.

Similar to 2024, court proceedings concerning jihadist terrorism concluded in 2025 resulted in convictions for 88% of the defendants. The concluded proceedings concerning right-wing terrorism also resulted in convictions for 88% of all defendants. Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism and left-wing terrorism-related proceedings concluded with a conviction rate of 76% and 41% of all accused respectively.

³³ Eurojust considers it one verdict if a person is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence and acquitted of another offence. If a person is acquitted of a terrorist offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as an acquittal.

Penalties

The average prison sentence for terrorist offences in the reported court proceedings concluded in 2025 was six years, which is similar to 2023 and 2024³⁴. The prison sentences handed down by courts in the Member States for terrorist offences in 2025 ranged from two months to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Prison terms of up to five years remained the most common penalty for terrorist offences (67%). Penalties of 10 or more years of imprisonment were given to 17% of those convicted of terrorist offences.

It should, however, be taken into consideration that the severity of the penalty in each case depended on the respective offence and the specific circumstances and cannot serve any comparative purposes.

In some cases, the court ordered the suspension of all or parts of the penalty for a period of time or in its entirety, under specific probation conditions.

Other penalties were also ordered in addition, or as an alternative, to the prison sentences. These included community service, supervised probation, fines, or psychiatric treatment. In many cases the court-imposed restrictions on exercising certain civil and political rights, expulsion from national territory, fixed probation period upon release, involvement in de-radicalisation and re-integration programmes, a ban on holding public office, compensation to victims, withdrawal of citizenship, etc.

Offenders who were minor were given prison terms or placed in a correctional institution, in some cases with mandatory psychiatric and psychological monitoring or treatment.

³⁴ For the purpose of calculating the average prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years' imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years, unless the court indicated a specific number of years to be served. In cases where the court ordered a possibility of parole after a certain number of years have been served, that number of years is included in the overview.



Jihadist terrorism

03

JIHADIST TERRORISM

For the EU TE-SAT, jihadism may be described as a violent sub-set of Salafism that rejects democracy and elected parliaments, arguing that human legislation is at odds with God's status as the sole lawgiver. Jihadists aim to create an Islamic state governed exclusively by Islamic law (shari'a), as they interpret it. They legitimise their use of violence by referring to the classical Islamic doctrines on jihad. All those who oppose their jihadist interpretations of Islamic law are considered as 'enemies of Islam'³⁵.

Actors

Jihadist terrorist actors in the EU mostly acted alone or within networks of like-minded individuals, often transnational, rather than embedded within strict hierarchical organisations. All completed attacks were carried out by lone actors, who all appear to have been adult males. In some cases, the perpetrators were reported to have suffered from mental health issues.

Case example

On 13 February 2025, in Germany, a 24-year-old male drove his car into the rear of a moving crowd in Munich, killing two and injuring 57 people. The perpetrator was arrested at the scene and alleged to have committed the act out of religious motivation.

Some of the foiled attacks were plotted by underage males, while 108 out of 347 individuals arrested in the context of jihadist terrorist offences were 18 or younger³⁶.

Case example

On 7 October 2025, in Italy, a 17-year-old was arrested on suspicion of recruitment with terrorist purposes and the unlawful possession of harmful objects. A multimedia analysis revealed his online radicalisation and various internet searches regarding IS, jihad, weapons and bomb manufacturing. Among the content saved on his device was a pledge of allegiance to IS, forwarded to an identified individual who shared his radical ideology.

Perpetrators of jihadist terrorist attacks pledged allegiance to IS in several cases. Most often, however, there was little evidence that they were actually instructed by IS, nor did the group claim responsibility for them. In one case in 2025, an attacker had previous links to IS.

Case example

On 18 May 2025, in Germany, a 35-year-old man stabbed people with knives outside a local bar in Bielefeld, critically injuring four victims. The perpetrator joined IS in Syria by May 2015 at the latest. Even after his entry into Germany in the summer of 2023, he remained connected to IS. In early May 2025, he made the decision to kill as many randomly selected people as possible in the name of a global jihad.

³⁵ Some contributed attacks or arrests may not fully align with this description. However, this classification is used for analytical purposes. The EU TE-SAT follows the categorisation provided by the Member States.

³⁶ 15 out of 344 arrests reported by the Member States did not specify the age.

Most arrested suspects were reported to have been inspired by IS propaganda. Yet, some were found to express support for both IS and AQ, or even non-Salafi-jihadist terrorist groups. Anti-Semitic narratives frequently were a common element. In addition, irrespective of ideological preferences, a fascination with violence was noted to play a role in radicalisation.

Attribution to terrorist groups was typically indirect, based on factors such as law enforcement investigations or a pledge of allegiance (bay'a) made by the individual involved. Some suspects, however, appeared to be in direct contact with members of terrorist organisations in other countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Case example

On 18 June 2025, in Italy, a 20-year-old was arrested on suspicion of membership of IS. He shared propaganda material through a messaging platform and possessed material suitable for the manufacturing of weapons, devices and explosives. The individual also maintained contact with an ISKP member in Afghanistan, with whom he planned his journey to the region to participate in combat or carry out attacks in the West.

Many concluded court proceedings in 2025 concerned offences linked to terrorist groups in Syria, such as IS, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), while still listed, or their affiliates.

Some individuals were arrested for trying to travel to Syria in 2025 to join IS³⁷. Some other arrests reported in 2025 concerned individuals returning from conflict zones.

Case example

On 2 September 2025, in France, a 24-year-old returnee from Syria was arrested upon her arrival in France after she had been expelled by Türkiye. The woman was the daughter of two jihadists who died in Syria. Following statements concerning her jihadist background, she was charged and placed under judicial supervision.

Narrative

In 2025, the volume of official IS terrorist propaganda via its 'provinces' or regional branches remained at a low level. In addition to statements of attacks carried out, as of the end of 2025, IS published a few videos, but no speech from the leadership.

The most prominent pro-IS media outlet, Al-Azaim, which also played a role in the sudden rise in 2024 of the terrorist threats to Europe by the closely associated ISKP, suffered a serious blow in 2025 when one of its core members was arrested in a joint Turkish-Pakistani operation. This led to a sharp decline of its propaganda production. In 2025, the only consistently published IS ideological propaganda was the editorial of its weekly Arabic newsletter *al-Naba'*.

IS propaganda pursued various objectives: to (re)state the fundamental tenets of its ideology to promote group identity and cohesion; to antagonise perceived enemies - not only the global West and governments of Muslim countries, but also competitors within the jihadist milieu, including AQ; and to incite sympathisers to carry out autonomous attacks. To this latter end, IS propaganda exploited events perceived as victimising Muslims and generating grievances among

³⁷ 15 out of 486 arrests were reported on suspicion of travel for terrorist purposes, as the primary offence. An additional 9 arrests reported travel for terrorist purposes as an additional offence. A majority of these arrests concerned individuals that were trying to travel to Syria to join IS.

its audiences. Most prominently in 2025, it instrumentalised the conflict in Gaza to fuel anti-Semitic narratives, including calls to target Jewish individuals, communities and interests.

In 2025, IS avoided issuing statements of responsibility for inspired lone actor terrorist attacks carried out by supporters, as had been its practice in years past. The group also advised against recording and sending videos of allegiance. In contrast, it claimed that it broadly incited terrorist attacks by spreading its ideology. Indirect attribution helped IS promote itself as a primary actor on the jihadist scene. It also served to counter the risk of being marginalised to the advantage of other groups, which played a more active role in current conflicts, for example in Gaza.

Case example

The editorial of the 18 December 2025 *al-Naba'* issue, dedicated to the Bondi Beach attack in Australia, mocks the West for looking for IS organisation and leadership. The West overlooks the nature of IS, whose strength consists in its 'jihadi code'.

The conflict in Gaza was a recurrent theme in AQ's propaganda. This topic had always been a core issue for the former organisation and its founder, Osama bin Laden. AQ leveraged propaganda referring to Gaza to increase its influence on the jihadist scene, which declined following the rise of IS after its split from AQ in 2013.

Within the AQ franchise, the propaganda of the Somali Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin (HSM or al-Shabaab) and the Sahel-based JNIM was mostly focused on local issues. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, by contrast, was eager to exploit the conflict in Gaza to incite terrorist attacks against the West. AQAP published motivational and instructional propaganda under its 'Inspire' brand, writing guides for aspirational lone actors and using lessons learnt, even from non-jihadist terrorist attacks.

Case example

In June 2025, AQAP published a guide based on the 21 May 2025 terrorist attack in Washington, urging readers to follow the example of the Latino Christian attacker who acted to 'defend Palestine'. AQAP also published two other guides based on terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in Colorado and Manchester.

However, contrary to the decline of official and supportive propaganda, the trend of increasing user-generated terrorist content continued in 2025. Independent producers, quite often young individuals, demonstrated notable creativity in their approach. They frequently created short videos combining visual elements extracted from official terrorist propaganda, current news or sources unrelated to terrorism (e.g. sequences of videogames), with a 'soundtrack', generally jihadist hymns or passages of speeches of jihadist leaders.

Pro-IS media outlets also published threats against public events, most commonly as advice to supporters to choose a target from a list. However, this type of propaganda decreased compared to 2024, when pro-IS media outlets had launched an intense campaign of threats against sports events.

Means

Perpetrators of jihadist terrorist attacks in Member States continued to employ simple modus operandi. Eight of the nine completed jihadist terrorist attacks in 2025 were perpetrated by stabbing with knives; one attacker used his private car to ram people in a crowd. The targets were predominantly random people in public places.

Case example

On 15 February 2025, in Austria, a man killed a 14-year-old boy and injured several others in a random stabbing attack using a knife. The attacker pledged allegiance to IS. He had been radicalised online within a short period of time by himself, without influence or guidance from others.

While the use of complex attack methods continued to be discussed, the lack of operational experience or adequate contacts limited these ambitions.

Key means to link core terrorist organisations with the broad network of potential supporters are online communication and terrorist propaganda. Radicalisation processes often developed rapidly, frequently beginning with exposure to user-generated jihadist propaganda disseminated on a range of platforms, including online communities, youth-oriented social media or gaming platforms. Such content and platforms provided a low-threshold entry point, particularly for young and vulnerable individuals, with subsequent engagements frequently migrating to more secure online environments.

Among jihadist actors, a gradual increase in the use of AI for propaganda purposes was noted, possibly linked to the technological affinity of an increasingly younger jihadist scene. Some individuals also adopted strong security measures regarding their mobile devices, including the use of VPNs, encrypted applications, frequent reformatting of devices and repeated installation and uninstallation of mobile applications.

At the same time, notwithstanding the central role played by online spaces in radicalisation pathways, personal interactions remained important as well. Networks and groups that formed online then meet up in person, discussing for example attack plans or the possibilities to travel abroad to join IS.

Case example

On 22 April 2025, in the Netherlands, 14 young suspects were arrested. They were involved in the production and distribution of IS propaganda online. Certain suspects tried to encourage others to carry out terrorist offences. The suspects formed an online network, but some also met offline.

With regard to terrorist financing, attacks carried out by lone actors generally required minimal financial resources, particularly when simple methods were employed. Sporadically, cases of self-financing or third-party support have been observed, mainly to facilitate individuals' travel to conflict zone.

Case example

On 1 April 2025, in France, a 35-year-old female was arrested on suspicion of terrorism financing in favour of her friend engaged in jihad in Syria, who was still located there.

Sources of funding may be legitimate income, loans, social benefits, donations or crowd funding campaigns, but could also be illicitly generated via for example fraud, theft or the sale of drugs. Collections were also made within the Muslim community under the guise of charity. Unbeknownst to certain donors, these funds may be diverted abroad and used to support terrorist-related activities.

Funds were transferred through bank transfers, hawala banking, money transfer services or money couriers. There was also a growing interest in using digital money transfers and virtual currencies.

Right-wing terrorism and violent extremism

04

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

For the EU TE-SAT, right-wing terrorists seek to transform the political, social and economic system into an authoritarian model, rejecting democratic order and values and fundamental rights. A core concept is supremacism, or the idea that as a group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture, etc.), they are superior to all others and consider it to be their natural right to dominate the rest of the population. Right-wing violent ideologies feed on a variety of hateful sub-cultures that often oppose diversity in society and equal rights of minorities³⁸.

Actors

Lone actors and small cells remained the most common perpetrators of right-wing terrorism and violent extremism incidents. They regularly lacked formal ties to right-wing terrorist or violent extremist organisations, but many were assessed not to be entirely isolated. Several of them were influenced by, or loosely connected to, broader violent right-wing networks. This often happened via engagement in fluid online structures and virtual ecosystems, but also via in-person associations.

Case example

On 25 February 2025, the leader and two members of the Sturmjäger Division, a neo-Nazi group inspired by the ideology of The Base, were convicted in Belgium. The leader of the group spread propaganda to recruit new members, incited and instructed group members to violence and set up members' 'rank lists' on the basis of the executed actions. He also shared manuals and videos on how to make weapons and explosives and encouraged group members to prepare for violent acts. He was sentenced to a prison term of eight years and a fine. The other two members spread extremist propaganda through social media and incited others to commit terrorist acts. They were sentenced to 40 months and 24 months of imprisonment respectively and a fine.

All individuals involved in attack plots or arrested on suspicion of right-wing offences were male. Multiple Member States raised concern about radicalisation in prison and/or the release from prison of former arrestees still adhering to extremist ideas. One arrested individual had previously spent time in prison.

Perpetrators of right-wing attacks and suspects often included young people and frequently displayed a range of vulnerabilities, including mental health issues or broader psychosocial challenges.

Such individuals were at higher risk of rapid and widespread exposure to violent extremist propaganda, a vulnerability that is amplified within online extremist ecosystems. Easily

³⁸ Some contributed attacks or arrests may not fully align with this description. However, this classification is used for analytical purposes. The EU TE-SAT follows the categorisation provided by the Member States.

accessible, dynamic and encrypted digital environments accelerated radicalisation processes and the progression towards operational activity.

Case example

On 17 July 2025, in Italy, authorities dismantled a violent extremist group that was active in the virtual dissemination of neo-Nazi, accelerationist, supremacist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda, aimed at inciting discrimination or violence on racial, ethnic and religious grounds.

In parallel, offline organisational structures complemented the right-wing terrorism and violent extremism landscape in the EU, encompassing groups primarily nationally focused as well as transnational networks. This included both established organisations and newly emerging entities. Of the five attacks reported, two were not attributed to lone actors. The average age of individuals involved in such offline groups appeared to be higher than that of those engaged primarily in online environments.

Case example

In February 2025, in Germany, police arrested two male members of the Letzte Verteidigungswelle (Last Wave of Defence) for attacking a refugee shelter. They spray painted “L.V.W” and xenophobic slogans, gave a fascist salute, and aimed a battery of fireworks at the building. In May 2025, authorities arrested another four suspected members and one supporter of this same right-wing group. The group aims to dismantle Germany’s democratic system through violence, especially arson and bomb attacks against migrants and political opponents.

Prominent, though not exhaustive, examples of violent transnational networks included The Base and so-called ‘Active Clubs’. The Base is a neo-Nazi, accelerationist paramilitary network composed of cells operating in the EU, amongst others. It is the first and only right-wing group to be included on the EU’s terrorist sanctions list. So-called ‘Active Clubs’ constitute a decentralised network of groups that cultivate physical strength, group solidarity and personal confidence. They adhere to right-wing extremist ideologies and have an active presence in multiple Member States across the EU³⁹.

Case example

On 25 November 2025, in Spain, three members of the terrorist organisation The Base were arrested on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation, recruitment, indoctrination and training for terrorist purposes; collaboration with a terrorist organisation; and various related offences such as unlawful possession of weapons⁴⁰.

As commonly observed in the past, right-wing actors consistently maintained international networks and participated in events across various EU countries, including music concerts and festivals, MMA and boxing tournaments, commemorative marches, demonstrations and seminars. These gatherings provided opportunities for individuals to meet, strengthen relationships and establish enduring transnational cooperation.

³⁹ “Active Clubs” functions as an umbrella label. It serves in some cases as a model for similar clubs that do not explicitly use this name, while at the same time there are also ordinary training schools and gyms that operate under this label without any connection to right-wing extremism.

⁴⁰ Europol 2025, ‘Europol and Spanish national police disrupt activities of far-right terrorist group The Base, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-and-spanish-national-police-disrupt-activities-of-far-right-terrorist-group-base>.

Narrative

Traditional right-wing narratives remained persistent, but were increasingly shaped and complemented by a diverse range of ideologies and ideas, including conspiracy theories. This contributed to a decline in overall ideological consistency. Additional influential drivers included accelerationist concepts, nihilistic justifications for violence and elements drawn from other violent subcultures. In some cases, these influences even intersected with jihadist frameworks, as illustrated by concepts like ‘White Jihad’.

Case example

On 12 February 2025, in Italy, a 15-year-old was arrested on charges including conspiracy to commit terrorism, the manufacturing and use of explosive devices, illegal possession of weapons, aggravated damage and the possession and distribution of child sexual abuse material (CSAM). He was very active on online channels, a suspected member of a Satanist, neo-Nazi supremacist group and joined a right-wing group allegedly planning a terrorist attack. Investigators also found content linked to IS, including propaganda, attack footage, beheadings and instructions for improvised explosive devices (IED).

Terrorist content online typically focused on past perpetrators and attacks, specific terrorist organisations or the portrayal of violence as a necessary means, often at the expense of a clearly articulated ideological components.

Case example

On 13 December 2025, in Italy, a 15-year-old was arrested following an investigation into his activities in radicalised supremacist, neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic online environments. He shared numerous posts openly praising and glorifying white supremacist attackers and perpetrators of deadly school shootings.

Certain right-wing actors deliberately chose - at least in public - to avoid overtly extremist or terrorist rhetoric. This strategy may avoid law enforcement scrutiny and/or make their ideas acceptable to a broader audience, thereby contributing to the normalisation of such narratives.

While approximately 30% of right-wing associated arrests were linked to incitement and the making of threats, several Member States also noted the ongoing prevalence of hate speech. Although often offensive, such speech may remain lawful, underscoring the complexity of determining precisely where the threshold for terrorist content lies.

Case example

On 12 September 2025, in the Netherlands, a 31-year-old man was arrested for making several online threats with terrorist intent. These were threats of violence against Muslims and he indicated a specific time for a stabbing. He also gave the fascist salute.

Physical meetings and personal connections served as one channel for disseminating propaganda, as illustrated by various international events attended by right-wing circles. However, propaganda also spread extensively online. Users leveraged social media platforms and digital services to share a wide range of content, including documents, photographs, videos, GIFs, memes and music. In this context, it is noteworthy that right-wing terrorist or violent extremist actors often relied on symbols and aesthetic codes, such as runes, numeric codes or meme characters, both to signal group affiliation and to circumvent moderation in online spaces.

Means

Firearms and explosives have traditionally held a particular appeal for right-wing terrorist and violent extremist actors. The five terrorist attacks in the EU in 2025 included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), firearms and bladed weapons.

Additionally, while it remained challenging to develop and adopt other tools, right-wing terrorist and violent extremist actors continued to display a fascination in more innovative attack methods such as 3D-printed weapons or drones.

Case example

On 16 June 2025, in Portugal, four individuals were arrested on suspicion of planning to commit offences related to a terrorist group and for the possession and manufacturing of 3D-printed weapons with a terrorist intent.

In general, the threat of violence was often directed at places of worship, religious communities, asylum seekers' centres, perceived ideological enemies or ethnic minorities.

Case example

On 4 November 2025, in Ireland, two men were identified as part of a group planning a terrorist attack on a mosque using explosives and incendiary devices. The plot has been claimed by the so-called Irish Defence Army (IDA). Two additional individuals have been released from custody pending further direction from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Segments within the right-wing landscape in the EU, including the so-called 'Active Clubs', were engaged in a range of physical training activities, including martial arts, boxing, survival training, fight clubs and shooting practice. This enabled participants to acquire potentially dangerous skills and tactical knowledge. These activities often went hand in hand with an emphasis on physical fitness, discipline, group cohesion and personal confidence.

Considering the means for radicalisation and recruitment, the previously identified uptick in the use of messaging services continued. Users resorted to these platforms to recruit other members, share propaganda, promote violence and plan physical attacks. This growth was accompanied by a well-established abuse of other social media services and online platforms, including gaming platforms. The rise of AI enabled new opportunities regarding widespread content creation, but also to gather information to plan and prepare attacks.

Users continued to employ several common practices to elude moderation efforts and reduce down time. For instance, they created multiple channel aliases and rebranded them or renamed them at the same time. Content and networks could thus quickly be re-established if removed. Users avoided moderation attempts on themselves by continuously renaming themselves or creating numerous online identities that are left dormant until one or more are removed by the hosting platform.

Regarding financial means, most funds were raised and transferred via simple legal means, such as self-financing via personal funds, membership fees, sales of merchandise, entry fees for events or donation campaigns. However, some financial means were collected via illegal methods, such as engagement in criminal activities, and some actors adopted more advanced technical tools such as fundraising and money movements via cryptocurrencies.

**Left-wing and anarchist
terrorism and violent
extremism**

05

LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

For the EU TE-SAT, left-wing terrorist groups seek to trigger a violent revolution against the political, social and economic system of a state, in order to establish socialism and ultimately establish a communist and classless society. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. Anarchist terrorism is a term used to describe acts of violence committed by groups or individuals who promote the absence of authority as a societal model. Anarchists pursue a revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian agenda⁴¹.

Actors

Both terrorist organisations and lone actors were involved in left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks and arrests, but a majority of attacks were carried out by unknown perpetrators.

Case example

On 18 December 2025, in Italy, two masked individuals set fire to three private cars used by Guardia di Finanza, parked at the barracks hosting Rome's Financial and Economic Police Unit. The attack was claimed on 7 January 2026 in a document stressing the need to attack the military and internal control apparatus.

The concluded proceedings concerned activities related to or claimed by the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), the Revenge Coalition Group, Armed Response, and Revolutionary Continuity.

Case example

On 18 July 2025, in Greece, seven defendants were convicted for their role in several attacks with IEDs and grenades in Greek cities in 2023 and 2024. Responsibility was claimed by the terrorist organisation Revenge Coalition Group. The defendants were also prosecuted in relation to the letter bomb sent to the Thessaloniki Courthouse and addressed to the President of the Court of Appeal in 2024, responsibility for which was claimed by the terrorist organisation Armed Response. The leader of the group was sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. The remaining six defendants were handed prison terms ranging from two to over 30 years.

12 out of 13 arrestees for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences were men with ages ranging from 22 to 79 years old. One arrestee was a 39-year old woman.

The terrorist threat posed by returning left-wing or anarchist fighters who joined either side of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as those who have participated in combat operations or military training in Syrian-Kurdish conflict zones, persisted.

⁴¹ Some contributed attacks or arrests may not fully align with this description. However, this classification is used for analytical purposes. The EU TE-SAT follows the categorisation provided by the Member States.

Violent extremists continued to maintain transnational networks, frequently travelling between Member States. These interactions strengthened interpersonal ties, facilitated the exchange of strategies and operational knowledge and reinforced support for imprisoned or deceased associates.

In 2025, some countries observed a shift towards more violent behavior, including the use of harsher tactics, heightened unpredictability and a growing willingness to consider certain individuals as legitimate targets.

Narrative

The narratives by left-wing and anarchist terrorist actors remained largely consistent, frequently incorporating references to the conflict in Gaza. Anti-Semitism, anti-Israeli or anti-Zionist sentiments were explicitly expressed in seven out of 10 responsibility claims reported.

Case example

On 18 January 2025, in Italy, an IED caused material damage to a building housing a travel agency. This terrorist attack was claimed on 24 January 2025 through a parcel sent to the company, containing a bullet and a letter stating that transporting goods and weapons to Israel is certainly profitable, but extremely dangerous.

The conflict in Gaza served as a mobilising factor in the left-wing extremist environment, fostering a sense of unity among diverse actors by framing a perceived common adversary.

Beyond the conflict, left-wing and anarchist terrorist and violent extremist actors often brought together several narratives and grievances. Other themes included anti-militaristic, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialism, anti-prison and anti-corporate sentiments; solidarity to incarcerated anarchists; and opposition to State repression and to migration control policies. Additional issues included support for the Kurdish cause, anti-technology positions and anti-racism.

Case example

On 31 March 2025, in Italy, an IED was found and disarmed in the Criminology Department of the University of Perugia. The anarchist group Kyriakos Xymitiris claimed responsibility. They emphasised that they wanted to target a training centre for the future (national) intelligence community.

Climate and environmental issues also remained a major concern in the left-wing and anarchist violent extremist scene. Some individuals demonstrated increased levels of radicalisation, engaging in disruptive actions such as civil disobedience, sabotage and property damage.

Means

Left-wing and terrorist attacks in 2025 indicate a continued use of simple and easily accessible tools. Arson was the preferred means in six terrorist attacks, with improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) used in three of them and fire accelerators in the rest. IEDs were used in three completed attacks and one failed attack. Two terrorist attacks resulted in limited damage to property with rudimentary or unknown means.

Case example

On 11 April 2025, in Greece, two perpetrators placed a backpack containing an IED outside the premises of the Hellenic Train company. The explosion caused material damage to the building as well as to nearby buildings and cars. The Revolutionary Class Self Defence claimed responsibility for the attack through on a known anarchist website on 13 April 2025.

Targets of left-wing and anarchist terrorist and violent extremist actors included municipal buildings, financial institutions and banks, corporate entities, university premises, telecommunications infrastructure and targets linked to law enforcement and prison administration. Symbolic attacks targeting corporate entities allegedly connected to Israel were also committed.

Most terrorist attacks were relatively low cost and could be financed either by perpetrators themselves or through funds collected within broader left-wing and anarchist networks. Funding generally relied on a variety of sources, including personal income, membership fees, donations, crowdfunding initiatives, the sale of accessories, literature and other products, fundraising events and, in some cases, the illegitimate use of governmental financial support allocated to legitimate left-wing extremist foundations and associations.

Terrorist and violent extremist left-wing and anarchist actors were generally hesitant in their use of social media. Nevertheless, online platforms have remained important for public engagement, ideological dissemination and mobilisation efforts, while some actors demonstrated significant technical expertise, employing encrypted messaging, secure email and anonymity-focused platforms, along with other tools to safeguard identity and data. While social media facilitates rapid mobilisation, encrypted closed groups are often used for internal coordination.

The use of AI remained contested, but was nonetheless likely used by some violent left-wing and anarchist actors to produce propaganda. It allows for the automated production of propaganda, thereby enabling extremist narratives to spread at minimal cost and with global reach.

At the same time, technological developments have not replaced offline socialisation. In some cases, prison environments or contacts with released terrorists have also further facilitated radicalisation and recruitment.

**Ethno-nationalist
and separatist terrorism
and violent extremism**

06

ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

For the EU TE-SAT, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out a state for themselves from a larger country or annex territory from one country to that of another. Left-wing or right-wing ideological elements are not uncommon in ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups⁴².

Actors

There were no verified ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks in the EU reported by Member States in 2025, but the number of arrests signals that it remains a threat. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) remained the most significant actor affecting the EU, while dissident republican groups and Corsican and Basque separatist actors also stayed active.

Case example

On 20 May 2025, in Germany, a 61-year-old male was arrested on suspicion of being a member of the PKK. He is suspected of having served as a full-time PKK cadre between June 2016 and July 2023, being responsible for the coordination and implementation of propaganda activities in Europe.

The average age of individuals arrested for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences was 45, with ages ranging from 20 to 76, and a large majority of them being male⁴³.

The most significant development affecting the ethno-nationalist and separatist threat environment in the EU was Abdullah Öcalan's call of 27 February 2025 for the PKK to disarm and dissolve, followed by the organisation's announcement in May that it would dissolve and end armed struggle. However, despite the political significance and the uncertainty it introduced, several Member States assessed that it has not yet led to any significant changes in support structures or operational behaviour in the EU.

Dissident republican groups remained relevant primarily in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The principal actors continued to be the New Irish Republican Army (IRA), Continuity IRA and other splinter republican structures that reject the peace settlement and retain an anti-state and anti-security force orientation. Member State reporting indicated that these organisations remain small, clandestine and criminally embedded.

Case example

On 10 March 2025, in Ireland, two males were arrested for membership of an unlawful organisation suspected for involvement in IRA operational activity. Evidence suggesting an

⁴² Some contributed attacks or arrests may not fully align with this description. However, this classification is used for analytical purposes. The EU TE-SAT follows the categorisation provided by the Member States.

⁴³ 32 arrested individuals were male. Two arrested individuals were women.

attempt to conceal unidentified items in a forested area was recovered. Two other male suspects were also stopped and searched at a location some distance away from the scene.

Corsican separatist violence remained relevant in France. The principal reference points continued to be the Fronte di liberazione naziunale di a Corsica (FLNC) and newer youth-linked clandestine structures, notably Ghjuventù Clandestina Corsa (GCC). These actors continued to pursue armed struggle, even though the volume of attributable activity remained below the 2023 peak.

Case example

In May 2025, in France, authorities arrested several individuals suspected of carrying out, or attempting to carry out, explosive or arson-related acts of vandalism in Corsica in October 2023, claimed by the FLNC.

In 2025, there was an increase in violence by the Basque extremist separatist milieu. This activity mostly involved younger actors from a pro-independence environment, close to the ultra-left. At the same time, Catalan extremist separatism remained fragmented, operationally weak and largely limited to sporadic and symbolic activity, with no indication of capacity for sustained or scalable violence.

Other individuals or groups may hold ethno-nationalist or separatist motivations, but are assessed to have been less prominently represented in 2025. Occasionally, there was some overlap with the left-wing scene.

Narrative

The exact ethno-nationalist and separatist narratives varied by actor, but were typically centred on self-determination and identity politics, local grievances, perceived repression by the state, solidarity with affiliated communities abroad and the portrayal of violence or coercion as legitimate resistance.

Digital platforms continued to support propaganda dissemination, recruitment, financing and mobilisation across the ethno-nationalist and separatist environment. The dominant channels reported by Member States included websites, television channels, social media platforms, messaging applications, print publications and online media.

Means

No terrorist attacks were reported. Most activities were concentrated on logistical support, propaganda, recruitment and financing, with the latter being a key dimension in the ethno-nationalist and separatist landscape in the EU.

Case example

On 4 November 2025, in Finland, three male individuals were arrested on suspicion of collecting money for the PKK in Finland.

In the PKK context, both online and offline communication was central to strategic messaging, ideological dissemination, event mobilisation and network maintenance. Regarding PKK financing, Member States assessed it as structured, transnational and diversified. It included annual campaigns such as Kampanya, voluntary donations, coerced contributions, membership

fees, event-based collection, commercial fundraising and the use of associations, media entities, charitable fronts, cash couriers and other legal and illegal channels.

The nexus with organised crime remained visible in the context of ethno-nationalist terrorism and violent extremism. Illegal PKK fundraising was associated with fraud, money laundering and extortion. There were also indications of links between PKK-related networks and organised criminal actors, including drug trafficking connections. Dissident republican groups were likewise reported to be regularly involved in extortion, smuggling, drug dealing, protection activity and debt collection.



Outlook

07

The threat posed to the European Union by terrorism and violent extremism is expected to remain highly dynamic. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving geopolitical, socio-economic and technological environment, the coming period is assessed as critical in shaping the future terrorist and extremist threats, as well as in determining the effectiveness of efforts to counter them.

A shifting context

Ongoing international conflicts and developments, rapid technological progress, evolving political and institutional dynamics, migration pressures, economic uncertainty and financial instability, and unforeseen crises are among the key drivers currently reshaping the context in which terrorism and violent extremism develop.

The accumulation of these drivers contributes to polarisation and the spread of hostile rhetoric, particularly when complex issues are framed in overly simplistic and adversarial terms. This in turn fuels violent extremist and terrorist narratives and self-perceived identities. It shapes views on reality, objectives, and perceived enemies - such as political opponents, global elites and marginalised communities. Extremist ideas, including the mere use of violence for the sake of violence, may become normalised. Fringe movements may also acquire increased visibility and momentum, while new themes may emerge in the terrorism and violent extremism landscape.

As terrorism and violent extremism are increasingly nurtured online, digital infrastructure and communication technology further amplify these radicalisation processes. Encrypted messaging apps, anonymous forums, algorithm-driven social media platforms and other modern technologies still allow for the spread of propaganda and the circulation of ambiguous, contradictory, or unstable ideas. This enables the creation of unique ideological frameworks that are often largely dependent on the personal circumstances of the potential perpetrator. Mental health challenges and other vulnerabilities heighten this risk: where resilience is low, extremist and terrorist narratives are more likely to take hold. As digital and physical lives become more intertwined, the likelihood of online radicalisation translating into real-world violence and possible terrorist attacks continues to grow.

Additionally, these drivers contribute to the emergence of a broader range of actors who may direct, enable or employ tactics resembling terrorist *modi operandi*. These may include hybrid threat actors, criminal networks and individuals primarily motivated by a propensity for violence. As some actors may steer or facilitate terrorist activity rather than carry it out directly, while others may simultaneously engage in other forms of criminality, it may become increasingly difficult to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence or criminal conduct.

Future threats

The combined impact of these drivers is assessed as likely to play a critical role in shaping the future terrorism and violent extremism landscape in the EU. Although they indicate significant shifts in the threat environment, uncertainty remains regarding the ways in which these threats will ultimately materialise.

Low-level terrorist attacks are likely to remain a persistent threat and may increase in frequency. Their simple execution and limited planning requirements make them particularly challenging to identify and disrupt. Jihadism remains likely to account for most terrorist attacks and arrests.

At the same time, the pool of potential perpetrators broadens as a growing diversity of ideologies and actors mobilise individuals, while online environments facilitate the rapid, broad and secure dissemination of terrorist narratives and operational knowledge.

Simultaneously, however, the interaction of the strategic context and several risk factors points to the possibility of more complex or large-scale attacks. Returning foreign terrorist fighters, together with individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences who are being released from prison, could reintroduce actors with operational expertise and experience into the EU threat landscape. Competition for notoriety, the gamification of violence and the pursuit of attention within online extremist ecosystems, may incentivise individuals to plan more sophisticated and high-impact attacks. Technological developments combined with the rapid dissemination of technical knowledge, may also lower the barriers to more complex operations. Younger and technologically adept perpetrators may pose a particular risk in this context. Finally, structured and coherent organised terrorist groups continue to exist and may retain the resources, coordination and intent required to carry out more complex attacks within the EU.

Terrorist propaganda is increasingly tailored to younger audiences and disseminated through the same digital platforms and tools that are widely used by this demographic group.

While target selection is likely to remain relatively consistent with established patterns - including attacks against civilians, specific communities or public spaces - there may be a growing shift towards more random or opportunistic targeting. Such a development could reflect an increased focus among certain actors on maximising psychological impact and societal disruption through the creation of fear, uncertainty and insecurity.

ANNEXES

Tables

Terrorist attacks per outcome, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2025

	Completed	Failed	Foiled	Total
Austria	1	-	6	7
Belgium	-	-	2	2
France	3	-	11	14
Germany	4	-	-	4
Greece	1	1	-	2
Ireland	1	-	1	2
Italy	10	1	-	11
Malta		1	-	1
Netherlands	1	-	-	1
Spain	1	-	-	1
Total	22	3	20	45

Terrorist attacks (completed, failed and foiled) per type of terrorism, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023-2025

	2023	2024	2025
Jihadist	14	24	24
Right-wing	2	1	5
Left-wing and anarchist	32	21	12
Ethno-nationalist and separatist	70 ⁴⁴	4	-
Other and not specified	2	8	4
Total	120	58	45

⁴⁴ These 70 separatist attacks were contributed by France in EU TE-SAT 2024. It should be noted that in EU TE-SAT 2024, France reported data on ethno-nationalist and separatist attacks for the years 2021, 2022 and 2023. Four attacks were carried out in 2021, 22 in 2022 and 44 in 2023.

Jihadist terrorist attacks, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Completed	5	6	9
Failed	-	-	-
Foiled	9	18	15
Total	14	24	24

Right-wing terrorist attacks, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Completed	-	1	1
Failed	-	-	-
Foiled	2	-	4
Total	2	1	5

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Completed	23	17	11
Failed	8	4	1
Foiled	1	-	-
Total	32	21	12

Ethno-nationalist and separatist attacks, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Completed	70	4	-
Failed	-	-	-
Foiled	-	-	-
Total	70⁴⁵	4	-

⁴⁵ These 70 separatist attacks were contributed by France in EU TE-SAT 2024. It should be noted that in TE-SAT 2024, France reported data on ethno-nationalist and separatist attacks for the years 2021, 2022 and 2023. Four attacks were carried out in 2021, 22 in 2022 and 44 in 2023.

Other/not specified terrorist attacks, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Completed	-	6	1
Failed	1	1	2
Foiled	1	1	1
Total	2	8	4

Arrests for terrorist offence per type of terrorism per Member State, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023-2025

	2023	2024	2025
Jihadist	334	289	347
Right-wing	26	47	43
Left-wing and anarchist	14	28	13
Ethno-nationalist and separatist	25	27	34
Other and not specified	27	58	49
Total	426	449	486

Arrests for jihadist terrorist offences, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Austria	18	22	40
Belgium	67	25	30
Bulgaria	1	-	-
Cyprus	-	8	1
Czechia	-	3	6
Denmark	1	1	5
Estonia	-	-	1
Finland	-	3	-
France	62	58	64
Germany	39	37	21
Greece	2	1	-
Hungary	1	1	-
Ireland	9	1	4
Italy	14	14	26
Latvia	1	2	-
Luxembourg	5	-	-
Malta	9	3	-
Netherlands	18	23	40
Poland	1	1	2
Portugal	-	-	1
Romania	2	1	3
Slovakia	1	-	-
Spain	78	78	100
Sweden	5	7	3
Total	334	289	347

Arrests for right-wing terrorist offences, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Belgium	12	2	5
Czechia	-	1	-
Denmark	-	1	-
Finland	2	-	-
France	4	8	5
Germany	1	8	8
Hungary	-	3	-
Ireland	1	-	3
Italy	4	15	3
Latvia	-	1	-
Netherlands	5	7	8
Poland	-	-	4

Portugal	-	-	4
Slovakia	2	1	-
Spain	-	-	3
Total	31	47	43

Arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorist offences, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Belgium	-	-	1
France	-	-	2
Germany	1	1	-
Greece	2	20	1
Italy	10	6	6
Netherlands	-	-	1
Spain	1	1	2
Total	14	28	13

Arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist offences, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Finland	-	5	3
France	11	-	7
Germany	1	9	5
Greece	1	-	-
Ireland	4	-	4
Italy	6	10	13
Spain	1	3	2
Sweden	1	-	-
Total	25	27	34

Arrests for other/not specified terrorist offences, as reported to Europol by EU Member States in 2023–2025

	2023	2024	2025
Belgium	4	-	8
Bulgaria	1	-	-
Czechia	-	1	-
Denmark	-	3	-
France	1	3	6
Germany	9	-	3
Greece	2	-	-

Hungary	-	2	-
Ireland	1	-	-
Italy	-	17	-
Lithuania	-	-	3
Luxembourg	-	-	1
Malta	-	1	1
Netherlands	5	10	14
Poland	-	12	3
Slovakia	-	1	-
Spain	4	8	10
Total	27	58	49

Number of convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences per EU MS in 2023, 2024⁴⁶ and 2025⁴⁷, as reported to Eurojust

Member State	2023	2024	2025
Austria	39	64	100
Belgium	67	62	33
Bulgaria	-	1	-
Croatia	1	-	3
Czechia	-	2	4
Denmark	5	11	4 ⁴⁸
Estonia	-	-	3
Finland	5	3	1
France	90	133	121
Germany	63	54	36
Greece	2	-	23
Hungary	4	15	31
Italy	5	29	31
Latvia	-	1	1
Lithuania	-	-	1
Malta	-	-	1
Netherlands	46	51	52
Poland	-	-	1
Portugal	-	2	1
Romania	1	-	1
Slovak Republic	-	2	-
Spain	29	54	51

⁴⁶ The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective EU TE-SAT reports.

⁴⁷ Eurojust received contributions containing information on convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences in 2025 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. The numbers included in the statistics concern only concluded proceedings for terrorist offences. It does not include proceedings for hate crime, racism or xenophobia.

⁴⁸ The numbers for Denmark include final judgments only.

Sweden	1	1	6
Total	358	485	505

Number of convictions and acquittals in 2025 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust

Member State	Jihadist	Right wing	Ethno-nationalist and separatist	Left wing and anarchist	Other/Not specified	Total
Austria	93	-	2	3	2	100
Belgium	29	4	-	-	-	33
Croatia	-	3	-	-	-	3
Czechia	1	1	1		1	4
Denmark	2	1	-	-	1	4
Estonia	-	3	-	-	-	3
Finland	-	-	1	-	-	1
France	96	24	-	-	1	121
Germany	24	5	4	1	2	36
Greece	-	-	-	14	9	23
Hungary	-	-	-	-	31	31
Italy	14	2	-	4	11	31
Latvia	-	1	-	-	-	1
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	1	1
Malta	1	-	-	-	-	1
Netherlands	19	5	-	-	28	52
Poland	-	-	-	-	1	1
Portugal	-	1	-	-	-	1
Romania	1	-	-	-	-	1
Spain	30	-	21	-	-	51
Sweden	6	-	-	-	-	6
Total	316	50	29	22	88	505

Number of convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2025, as reported to Eurojust

Member State	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Acquittals In %
Austria	81	19	100	19%
Belgium	32	1	33	3%
Croatia	3	-	3	0%
Czechia	4	-	4	0%
Denmark	4	-	4	0%
Estonia	3	-	3	0%
Finland	1	-	1	0%
France	114	7	121	6%
Germany	34	2	36	6%
Greece	17	6	23	27%
Hungary	31	-	31	0%
Italy	13	18	31	58%
Latvia	1	-	1	0%
Lithuania	1	-	1	0%
Malta	1	-	1	0%
Netherlands	24	28	52	54%
Poland	1	-	1	0%
Portugal	1	-	1	0%
Romania	1	-	1	0%
Spain	36	15	51	29%
Sweden	3	3	6	50%
Total	406	99	505	20%

Number of convictions and acquittals per type of terrorism in 2025, as reported to Eurojust

Type of terrorism	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Convictions In %
Jihadist	277	39	316	88%
Right-wing	44	6	50	88%
Ethno-nationalist and separatist	22	7	29	76%
Left-wing and anarchist	9	13	22	41%
Other/not specified	54	34	88	61%
Total	406	99	505	80%

Amendments to national terrorism legislation in 2025

Bulgaria

The State Gazette, issue No 61 of 2025, published a Law Amending and Supplementing the Criminal Code. This law introduces a completely new Chapter One A to the Bulgarian Criminal Code, entitled 'Terrorism'. The chapter consists of:

- Section 1 – Actual terrorist crimes (Articles 114a to 114i); and
- Section 2 – Non-actual terrorist crimes (Articles 114k to 114t).

All provisions of the new Chapter One A entered into force on 31 January 2026.

Furthermore, the Law Amending and Supplementing the Criminal Code introduces a legal definition clarifying when an act is considered to be committed for terrorist purposes within the meaning of the new Chapter One A. This definition is set out in Article 93(16) of the Criminal Code.

Czechia

An amendment to the Criminal Code implemented by Act No 270/2025 Coll. reduced the penalties for the crime of supporting and promoting terrorism under Section 312e of the Criminal Code, as well as for the crime of threatening with a terrorist attack under Section 312f of the Criminal Code.

The previous amendment set the penalty for these crimes at five to fifteen years if they were committed through print, film, radio, television, a publicly accessible computer network, or other similarly effective means. In practice, this meant that online statements approving terrorist crimes or threats of terrorist attacks, even if not meant seriously, would be punishable by unconditional prison sentences. The penalty has now been reduced to 3 to 12 years and allows for the imposition of an alternative penalty not involving direct imprisonment, which is particularly appropriate for people with no previous convictions. The penalties have not been reduced for other more serious terrorist crimes, such as terrorist attacks, terrorism, participation in a terrorist group, or terrorist financing.

Greece

Law No 5232/2025 was adopted to transpose Directive (EU) 2024/1226. It introduced significant changes in the field of concealment and access to evidence, mainly focusing on the violation of EU sanctions and the management of criminal case files. In addition, Article 205 of Law No 5187/2025 introduced a restrictive recast of Article 187C (Favourable measures) of the Greek Criminal Code, without broadening its scope.

Hungary

Government Decree No 297/2025 (IX. 26.) on the State of Emergency Rules for Actions Against Specific Persons and Organisations and Government Decree 465/2025. (XII.29.) on the National List Against Terrorism, the Restrictive Measures Against the Listed Persons and the Effect Thereof were issued. The former government decree provides for definition of the national terrorism list, the procedure for inclusion on the list, the amendment thereof and the imposable sanctions. Annex 1 to the latter government decree lists the terrorist groups, while Annex 2 includes the restrictive measures against the listed entities.

In addition, the provisions of Act LII of 2017 on the Implementation of Financial and Asset-related Restrictive Measures Ordered by the European Union and the UN Security Council were amended. In line with the creation of the national terrorism list, the Act was supplemented by Sections 7/A-7/C, which contain the most important rules and provisions regarding the list – among them inclusion in the list, the rules of declaring someone a terrorist and the restrictive measures and the enforcement thereof [Sections 11-13 of Act CXXV of 2025].

Most of the new provisions entered into force on 1 January 2026.

Italy

Legislative Decree No. 48 of 11 April 2025, converted into Law No. 80 of 9 June 2025 (Security Decree), came into force on 12 April 2025. It introduced Article 270-quinquies.3 of the Criminal Code *Possession of material for the purpose of terrorism*, which punishes with imprisonment for two to six years anyone who, outside the cases referred to in Articles 270-bis and 270-quinquies, knowingly obtains or possesses material containing instructions on the preparation or use of lethal warfare devices referred to in Article 1, first paragraph, of Law No. 110 of 18 April 1975, firearms or other weapons or harmful or dangerous chemical or bacteriological substances, as well as any other technique or method for carrying out acts of violence or sabotage of essential public services, for the purpose of terrorism, even if directed against a foreign state, an institution or an international organisation.

Legislative Decree No. 95 of 30 June 2025, which entered into force on 10 August 2025, converted with amendments into Law No. 118 of 8 August 2025, amended Italian anti-money laundering legislation (Legislative Decree No. 231/2007) and the measures to combat terrorist financing (Legislative Decree No 109/2007), imposing new responsibilities, particularly for the non-profit sector. Among the various measures introduced, Article 11 contains supplementary and corrective provisions for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. The Decree amends the following legislative acts:

1. Decree No 109/2007, which establishes measures to prevent, counter and suppress terrorist financing and the activities of countries that threaten international peace and security, pursuant to Directive 2005/60/EC. Accordingly, the Financial Security Committee ("Csf") is designated as the central point of contact for requests from foreign states and international organisations regarding the risk of terrorist financing of third sector entities (pursuant to Article 4 of Legislative Decree No 117/2017, Third Sector Code).
2. Decree No 231/2007, which transposes the same Directive with reference to the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as Directive 2006/70/EC which contains implementing measures. The definition of financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is clarified, referring to the provisions of Legislative Decree No 109/2007. The Minister of Economy and Finance has been granted powers – following consultation with the Csf - to identify high-risk countries, in addition to those already designated by the European Commission, pursuant to Article 4 (4-bis) of Legislative Decree No 231/2007. The role of the CSF in the national risk analysis associated with the financing of the proliferation of 'weapons of mass destruction'⁴⁹ has also been strengthened. This is achieved through three-yearly and extraordinary updates, to be made available to obligated entities for more effective risk management.

⁴⁹ Understood as the risk of failure to apply, and the evasion of, targeted financial sanctions.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Artificial Intelligence
AQ	Al-Qaeda
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Explosives
CSAM	Child Sexual Abuse Material
CT	Counter Terrorism
DDOS	Distributed Denial of Service
DHKP-C	The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi)
E2EE	End-to-end Encryption
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
ESOCC	European Serious Organised Crime Centre
EU	European Union
EU IRU	European Union Internet Referral Unit
FLNC	Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GCC	Ghjuventù Clandestina Corsa
HSP	Hosting Service Provider
HTS	Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IID	Improvised Incendiary Device
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
ISSP	Islamic State Sahel Province
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin
LEAs	Law Enforcement Authorities
LLM	Large Language Model
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party/Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê
RAD	Referral Action Days
TCO	Terrorist Content Online
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
VPN	Virtual Private Network



Your feedback matters.

By clicking on the following link or scanning the embedded QR code you can fill in a short user survey on the received strategic report.

Your input will help us further improve our products.